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SET THE CONTROLS FOR THE HEART OF THE MOON:
IS EXISTING LAW SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE RESOURCE
EXTRACTION ON THE MOON?1*
Mark J. Sundahl** & Jeffrey A. Murphy***
The extraction of natural resources from celestial bodies is an indispensable component of current plans to establish a permanent human presence on
the Moon, Mars, and, eventually, other planets and moons in our solar system.
These plans to settle the solar system begin with the international effort to
construct a Lunar Gateway which is moving forward alongside NASA’s Artemis program (which also involves international partners). This presence on
the Moon promises to gradually expand as other space agencies, together with
private industry, join the effort to create what is often referred to as a “Moon
Village.”1
Why is resource extraction an inescapable future reality? The simple answer is that the alternative (i.e., bringing all resources from Earth) would be
prohibitively expensive in light of the aggressive missions being planned by
NASA and others. Without going into the economic details of launching mass
into outer space (which are amply explained with a simple Google search),
suffice it to say that delivering oxygen, water, fuel, and construction materials
to the Moon from Earth would far more expensive than developing the capability to harvest such resources from the Moon—particularly if we are talking
about a Moon village with a significant population.

*
The title of this article is inspired by the song “Set the Controls for the Heart of the
Sun,” written by Roger Waters (Pink Floyd, A Saucerful of Secrets, 1968).
**
Professor of Law and Director of the Global Space Law Center at Cleveland State
***
Jeffrey A. Murphy is a 3LE at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. He wishes to offer
his sincere thanks to his infinitely patient wife, Autumn, and his two children, Oliver and
Corinne, for enduring this adventure with him. He extends his thanks and appreciation, as
well, to Prof. Sundahl for the opportunity and pleasure of working with him on this Article
and for his continued guidance.
1
The Moon Village Association has already created an extensive network of professionals dedicated to resolving the legal and technical issues that will face the early settlers
of the Moon. See MOON VILL. ASS’N, www.moonvillageassociation.org (last visited Apr.
17, 2020).
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Once this premise is accepted, the next questions are legal/regulatory in
nature. First comes the question of whether resource extraction is permissible
under international law. Some have argued that Article II of the Outer Space
Treaty prohibits mining operations as a logical corollary of the article’s ban
on the national appropriation of celestial bodies: “Outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”2
The purpose of this article of the Outer Space Treaty was to prevent the
repetition of the Age of Discovery where European countries raced to plant
their flags and claim all lands beyond the borders of Europe. Article II prohibits the United States from claiming the Moon as its fifty-first state (although the Apollo astronauts did plant flags to mark their arrival).3 However,
arguments to expand the meaning of this article so that it prohibits mining
have fallen flat. To drive this point home, changes to domestic law in the
United States, Luxembourg, and, most recently, Japan have codified the legality of space mining—and have done so with diminishing objections from
the international community.4
This Article argues that despite the existence of some open questions regarding fine points in the law and the unlikelihood of a new treaty regulating
lunar activity, investors (of whatever type, whether public or private) should
not be deterred due to any concern about the state of the law. The current
regulatory process to launch a vehicle and operate a payload may be “clunky”
in places, but it is not unduly burdensome. While there is plenty of debate
about regulatory reform, it is a debate about how to improve the existing system—not necessarily to fix it. In other words, existing international law is
already sufficient to protect the interests of investors, nations, and humankind.
This Article will first look at what resources are likely to be extracted and
why. We then describe the current international initiatives to forge new law
regarding resource extraction in outer space. We close by making the case that
2
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 2, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
3
Id.
4
For the U.S. law, see Space Resource Commercial Exploration and Utilization,
51 U.S.C. Ch. 513 (2015). For Luxembourg’s law, see Law on the Exploration and
Utilization of Space Resources (Loi du 20 juillet 2017 sur l’exploration et l’utilisation des
ressources de l’espace); of 20 July 2017, published July 28, 2017, available in both
French and English at https://space-agency.public.lu/en/agency/legal-framework.ht
ml. For the Japanese law, see Regulation for Enforcement of the Act on Launching
of Spacecraft, Etc. and Control of Spacecraft (Cabinet Office Order No. 50 of 2017),
https://www8.cao.go.jp/space/english/activity/documents/space_activity_act.pdf.
The legality of resource extraction under Japanese law is inferred from the permissibility of describing the purpose of a spacecraft in the launch license application as
designed for resource extraction. See E-mail from Souichirou Kozuka, Professor of
Law, Gakushuin Univ., to Mark J. Sundahl (Jan. 20, 2020) (on file with author).
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existing law, although not ideal in every way, provides sufficient legal protections and regulatory certainty to allow both governments and industry to move
forward with confidence.
To dispel a common misperception, platinum mines are not in the plans
for NASA and (most) other celestial pioneers.5 It’s true that there are virtually
unlimited amounts of platinum and other valuable metals in space. However,
the resource that will be most important as mankind establishes its first outposts on the Moon and Mars will be ice and other forms of water. Ice will
provide water to drink, oxygen to breathe, and hydrogen as fuel. Once these
needs are met, attention will turn to harvesting regolith for use as building
material.
The amount of readily available ice on the Moon and Mars is limited. The
south pole of the Moon holds the great majority of relatively easily accessible
ice and the race to reach the south pole is already on. In 2008, India’s Chandrayaan-1 mission discovered the widespread presence of ice in the regolith
of the south pole. In 2019, China’s Chang’e 4 spacecraft was the first to
achieve a soft landing near the south pole. It carried a rover named Yutu (or
“Jade Rabbit”) to explore the area near the landing site for traces of ice, among
other objectives.
The fact that ice is a limited natural resource is one of the prime drivers of
the need for a legal structure to ensure that a predictable legal regime is in
place so that extraction can take place in an orderly, efficient, and fair manner
without (military) conflict. Even more important at the moment is the need for
regulatory certainty so that investors in those companies that plan to locate,
retrieve, and process the ice (and then sell or itself use the ice-based products)
will feel sufficiently secure to continue funding these ventures. Entrepreneurs
need for assurance that they will have exclusive rights (which could be something less than property rights) over a certain surface area of a celestial body
before they will expend large amounts of capital sending equipment and personnel to the area to begin mining.
There have been two noteworthy attempts at the international level to create norms to regulate the harvesting of ice and other natural resources. The
1979 Moon Agreement was drafted with the intention to provide a set of rules
that would govern resource extraction.6 In particular, Article 11 called for the
creation of an international body that would undertake the drafting of these
rules. This meant that when a country ratified or acceded to the treaty, that
country bound itself to obey those rules—whenever they were adopted and

5

NASA, NASA’S PLAN FOR SUSTAINED LUNAR EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 6
(2020), www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/a_sustained_lunar_presence_nspc_re
port4220final.pdf (explaining that resource extraction experiments will explore the extraction of oxygen and water).
6
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3.
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whatever their substance.7 This provision, among others, was immediately repugnant to the United States and the USSR. In fact, no major space actor has
signed the treaty (which to date has only eighteen ratifications).8 It is widely
considered a failed treaty. Although there is talk currently in the halls of the
UN of a new push among the proponents of the Moon Treaty for its expanded
ratification as resource extraction activities are becoming a near-term reality,
this effort is not expected to go anywhere since the attitude of major space
actors toward the treaty has not changed.
Almost forty years later, in 2016, the University of Leiden and its consortium partners launched the Hague International Space Resources Governance
Working Group with the goal of creating “Building Blocks” that could, in
turn, be used as a guide for creating a new set of norms (of whatever nature,
including a treaty law, domestic laws, or some form of soft law, such as a set
of guidelines or best practices) regarding the extraction and use of natural resources.9 The members of the Working Group were drawn from academia,
industry, government, and NGOs who met twice a year for four years to debate the legal and policy issues that face the international community as resource extraction is commenced.
The resulting body of twenty Building Blocks recommended a registrybased system for registering so-called “priority rights.” Registrants would
have a priority right to work the registered mine. A resource right registration
would describe the location of the activity and a description of the activity to
be conducted. “Safety zones” would be established to provide a buffer zone
between the registered activity and any new activities undertaken by another
operator.10 How exactly these safety zones would be measured is left open by
the Building Blocks due to the wide variety of activities that could be registered. The safety zone for an operation on a low-gravity celestial body using
explosives would require a large buffer area. In contrast, an operation that
merely scraped ice off the surface of the Moon may not need much of a safety
zone at all. Other Building Blocks address diverse issues, such as the creation
of a database of best practices and measures for preventing harmful impacts
to the environment or the activities of other actors. The Building Blocks also
7

Id. at art. 11.
Status of Treaties: Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/page
s/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIV-2&chapter=24&clang=_en
(last
visited Apr. 17, 2020).
9
See Overview: The Hague International Working Group on the Governance of Space
Resource Activity, UNIVERSTEIT LEIDEN, www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/law/institute-of-pub
lic-law/institute-of-air-space-law/the-hague-space-resources-governance-working-group
(last visited Apr. 17, 2020). The Working Group was financed by contributions from the
Dutch Ministries of Foreign and Economic Affairs, the Secure World Foundation, and
Deep Space Industries.
10
So-called “buffer zones,” typically in the range of 500 meters, are routinely provided
for energy companies drilling for oil and gas from offshore platforms here on Earth.
8
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contain provisions to protect cultural/historical sites (such as the Apollo landing sites) as well as site of particular scientific interest.
The Building Blocks have now been transmitted to the UN Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in Vienna (COPUOS). A “general exchange
of views on potential legal models for activities in exploration, exploitation
and utilization of space resources” was placed on the agenda of the 2020 meeting of the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee.11 The Building Blocks will undoubtedly be an influential document as this discussion takes shape at the UN
(which will be aided by the high-profile attendance of key Hague Working
Group members at the subcommittee meetings).
Now the question presents itself: Are we likely to see the emergence of a
new treaty that will establish a comprehensive regime to govern resource extraction? The simple answer is no. In fact, any attempt to create a new treaty
will almost certainly meet the same fate as the Moon Agreement. If the planets
align and the old opposition among major players to treaty law somehow dissipate, the process of treaty-making in this day and age would be so protracted
as to be virtually irrelevant to the need for immediate investment in resource
extraction. Gone are the days of the 1960s and 1970s when four highly successful space treaties were concluded in less than a decade. The number of
countries directly involved in space activity has expanded exponentially since
the days when only the United States and the USSR had the ability to travel
beyond the Earth’s atmosphere. The COPUOS has become a complicated and
politically tumultuous body that makes consensus (the standard used by the
committee to take action) very difficult to achieve. As an example of how
arduous treaty-making can be, one need only look at the Space Assets Protocol
to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (a treaty
that creates an international regime governing security interests in, as well as
the leasing and sale of, satellites and other space assets).12 The project was
conceived in 1984 and the Space Assets Protocol was concluded in 2012—
twenty-eight years later. As of this writing, the treaty has only been signed by
four states and ratified by none (ten ratifications are required for the protocol
to enter into force).13
So, where does this leave us? Is the world to move forward with settling
the solar system without any binding law governing resource extraction activity? Will humanity be able to build a Moon village without a system of
11

See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Annotated Provisional Agenda of
the 2020 Meeting of the UNCOPUOS Legal Subcomm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.312
(2020).
12
For a general discussion of the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, see MARK J. SUNDAHL, THE CAPE TOWN CONVENTION: ITS OPERATION AND RELATION
TO THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE (2010).
13
Status: Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on
Matters Specific to Space Assets (Berlin, 2012), UNIDROIT, www.unidroit.org/status-201
2-space (last visited Apr. 17, 2020).
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recognizing the right to occupy a particular territory and extract resources
from the surface and sub-surface of the Moon without interference from other
actors? That scenario is scary. The possibility of conflicts between actors goes
through the roof if there is not (1) a transparent system of registering land
claims and (2) a binding legal regime that enables easy enforcement of these
land claims. The next question is how to get there? If not by treaty, then how?
Maybe a UN model law based on the Hague Building Blocks? This model law
could facilitate the development of a “patchwork” of domestic laws which (1)
provide for a national (or international) registry of claims, (2) provide for the
easy enforcement of these claims, and (3) recognize the registered claims of
nationals of other states.
A patchwork of domestic laws is one alternative to a multilateral treaty.
But how good of an alternative is it? Given the fact that the U.S., Luxembourg,
and Japan have already adopted laws regarding space resource extraction, the
formation of bilateral or trilateral treaties among these states is easily foreseeable. Would the European Union consider joining the group? Australia?
China? Russia? Brazil? India? All of these states and more, we hope.
So how good of an alternative to treaty law is this patchwork approach? It
has the potential to provide a level of legal certainty comparable to a treaty
and has the distinct advantage of being politically feasible in the short term.
Even if the international community headed down the road of seeking hard
law, how long will it take to forge a multilateral among these nine parties?
Five years? Ten years? Never?
Let us wrap up this Article by taking up that last possibility. What if the
international community is never able to conclude a broadly ratified treaty
governing space resource extraction? Would we be doomed? Or could it be
that we have sufficient laws in place already? In other words: Does existing
space law suffice to govern the coming mining industry on the Moon and other
celestial bodies?
The answer is yes—in a minimalist sense. In this thought experiment, the
following laws suffice to enable the mining industry:
• the duty to operate in space “with due regard to the corresponding
interests” of other states (Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty14)
• the duty to consult with affected states if there is a possibility of
harmful interference with another state’s activity (Article IX of
the Outer Space Treaty15)
• the liability that attaches when a state or national causes damage
(The Liability Convention16)

14

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, at art. IX. $
Id. %
16
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar.
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force Sept. 1, 1992).
15
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general international law regarding (1) state liability and (2) prohibitions on the use of force (Corfu Channel/Nicaragua17)
Due regard is one of the touchstones of the Outer Space Treaty. It requires
that the “corresponding interests” of other states be considered, at a minimum,
when conducting space activities.18 But the duty could impose broader obligations beyond merely giving thought to the interests of other countries prior
to acting.19 Julia Gaunce concludes, in her analysis of the use of “due regard”
in the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), that the duty
requires “at least some consultation” with affected states.20 However, consultation “need not continue indefinitely or until the other party is happy.”21
Gaunce provides an example of what the arbitral tribunal in the Chagos arbitration considered a failure of the United Kingdom to fulfill this duty to act
with “due regard”:
The Tribunal found that the Applicant Mauritius holds rights
in the area of the [marine preserve] that arose from undertakings by the U.K. (reversionary rights to the Chagos Archipelago, and to fishing and preservation of mineral resources in its
territorial sea and EEZ). The Tribunal ruled that the U.K. had
“failed properly to balance its own rights and interests with
Mauritius’ rights” in deciding to create the [marine reserve].22
Perhaps most interestingly, Gaunce goes on to explain that the duty to operate with “due regard” in the context of the UNCLOS requires not only a
duty to take into account the interests of those states immediately affected, but
also the broader interests of the international community, including ecological
concerns and the effects of climate change:
The interpretation of due regard offered [in this paper] concludes, among other things, that the duty of due regard
17
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Preliminary Objection,
1948 I.C.J. 15 (Mar. 28).
18
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, at art. IX.
19
Our thanks to Jennifer Warren of Lockheed Martin who brought the use of the phrase
“due regard” in the UNCLOS to the attention of the authors. One should keep in mind, as
Julia Gaunce points out, that “the application of international law rules on interpretation of
treaties to identical or similar provisions of different treaties may not yield the same results,
having regard to, inter alia, differences in the respective contexts, objects and purposes,
subsequent practice of parties and travaux préparatoires.” Julia Gaunce, On the Interpretation of the General Duty of ‘Due Regard’, 32 OCEAN Y.B. ONLINE 27, 43 (2018) (citing
MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Provisional Measures, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2001), para. 51).
20
Gaunce, supra note 19, at 51 (internal citations omitted).
21
Id.
22
Id.
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encompasses not only a mutual duty bilaterally between competing states to balance their activities but also a duty to the
interests of the international community. In a post-laissez-faire
legal order of the seas, international community interests must
now also be identified with ecology, including climate change
mitigation.23
Article 3 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation requires states to exercise “due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft” when drafting their regulations regarding the operation of state aircraft.24 A working paper presented by the Federal Aviation Administration in
Paris in 2015 explains that the duty to operate with “due regard” to civil aviation requires that the pilot of a state aircraft operate as follows:
1. Separate his/her aircraft from all other air traffic; and
2. Assure that an appropriate monitoring agency assumes responsibility for search and rescue actions; and
3. Operate under at least one of the following conditions:
(a) In visual meteorological conditions (VMC); or
(b) Within radar surveillance and radio communications of a
surface radar facility; or (c) Be equipped with airborne radar
that is sufficient to provide separation between his/her aircraft
and any other aircraft he/she may be controlling and other aircraft; or
(d) Operate within Class G airspace.25
(e) An understanding between the pilot and controller regarding the intent of the pilot and the status of the flight should be

23

Id. at 59.
Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 3, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [Chicago Convention].
25
Class G airspace is uncontrolled airspace (which typically involves flight at very low
altitudes). AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL: OFFICIAL GUIDE TO BASIC FLIGHT
INFORMATION AND ATC PROCEDURES 3-3-1 (2017).
24
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arrived at before the aircraft leaves ATC [air traffic control]
frequency.26
Each of these conditions share the common goal of reducing the risk to
civil aircraft and the risk of injury or death to civilian passengers. For our
purposes, the more important lesson here is that these conditions all describe
positive actions that must be taken by pilots in order to comply with the obligation. It is not sufficient for pilots to merely take into consideration the risk
to civil aviation. Concrete action to reduce such risk must also be taken.27
In light of the foregoing, the requirement that states conduct space activities with due regard to the corresponding interests of other states has the potential to be interpreted more broadly than is typically understood and could
be seen as requiring not only consideration of other states’ interests, but also
the interests of the international community (including ecological/environmental interests). Moreover, beyond mere consideration of others’ interests,
operating with due regard appears to require consultations with affected states
and, perhaps, the taking of concrete actions to protect the interests of other
states. In other words, this existing duty may be more effective than previously
believed in addressing the concerns that surround resource extraction.
The duty to consult with affected states may be derived from the obligation
of “due regard,” but even if that were not so, Article IX of the Outer Space
Treaty makes explicit that consultation with affected states is required if there
is a possibility of “harmful interference” with such state’s activities:
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space
. . . would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use
of outer space . . . it shall undertake appropriate international
consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment.28
In addition to placing a duty to consult on the acting party, Article IX also
gives the affected state the right to request consultations if activity planned by

26

Id. at 1 (with some redactions).
For purposes of comparison, U.S. law requires a flight safety analysis prior to the
launch of a space vehicle. 14 C.F.R. §417.231(b). In the case of an orbital launch, for example, “the analysis must establish any launch waits needed to ensure that the launch vehicle, any jettisoned components, and its payload do not pass closer than 200 kilometers to
a manned or mannable orbiting object during ascent to initial orbital insertion through at
least one complete orbit.” Id. at §417.231(b). It is worth noting that only collisions with
“manned or mannable orbiting object.”
28
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, at art. IX.
27
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another state “would cause potentially harmful interference” to its activities.29
What exactly constitutes “harmful interference” in the context of Article IX is
subject to debate. Frans von der Dunk has argued that “[w]hile there is a generic legal interest emanating from the Outer Space Treaty to avoid harmful
interference . . . , the Treaty as such remains too unspecific and abstract to
serve as a helpful legal instrument to combat harmful interference.”30 This is
a rather cynical view on what constitutes “harmful interference.” But where
else can we look for guidance? Perhaps the best analogy is found in the ITU’s
Radio Regulation 1.169, which defines “harmful interference” thus:
interference which endangers the functioning of a radionavigation service or of other safety services or seriously degrades,
obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication service operating in accordance with Radio Regulations.31
Would activity that endangers the functioning of a mining operation constitute “harmful interference” under the Outer Space Treaty? What about activity that seriously degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts the operation
of a mine? I would argue that all such activities would constitute “harmful
interference” under the treaty. At the end of the day, the uncertainty at the
edges doesn’t necessarily cause a problem. The definition of “harmful interference” is much like the definition of the edge of space—there is no pressing
need to find a precise answer.
With this we have reached the end of our analysis of existing law. More
can be said about the Liability Convention, the international law on the use of
force, and domestic actions under tort law, but that is for another article.
We now bring the threads of this article together by positing the following:
The duty of due regard in concert with the duty to consult under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty are together sufficient
to:
(1) deter harmful interference among different actors;
(2) promote safe practices among all actors; and

29

Id.
Frans G. von der Dunk,“Space Side” to “Harmful Interference”—Evaluating Regulatory Instruments in Addressing Interference Issues in the Context of Satellite Communications, in HARMFUL INTERFERENCE IN REGULATORY PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL RULES FOR
INTERFERENCE-FREE RADIO COMMUNICATION: 3RD LUXEMBOURG WORKSHOP ON SPACE
AND SATELLITE COMMUNICATION LAW 87, 91 (Mahulena Hofmann ed., 2015).
31
47 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1984).
30
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(3) protect historical sites and sites of special scientific interest.32
This answers the question that was posed above: What if the political realities of the day prevent the creation of any new hard law? The answer is that
the mining industry can move forward with confidence that the international
order has already provided a sufficiently predictable and certain regulatory
regime. Once a mining operation is initiated on the Moon, all subsequent actors must act with due regard for its interests (or more accurately, the interests
of the operator’s country). Moreover, if a subsequent actor is planning a
nearby mining operation, that actor must actively engage any affected country
by initiating consultations in the event that the planned operation could harmfully interfere with the existing operations.
Now the final plea. The international community should create a new international registry as follows:33
• The UN would an create a registry of resource claims that is available online for free to the public 24/7.
• Each filing would contain the following information:
o Name of authorizing state
o Name and nationality of operator
o Location of the activity
o Nature of the activity
o Duration of the activity
• The registry would be indexed and searchable by location (by latitude/longitude or other appropriate cartographical parameters).
• A search would produce any filings made in proximity to the location searched (the closest existing operation being listed first).
• Sites of cultural heritage and scientific interest could be filed in
order to protect such sites.
The operation of the registry would be similar to the coordination process
used in conjunction with the ITU Master Register. When the registry opens,
those states and companies that are already operating on the Moon (or other
celestial bodies) would register their activity. The Apollo landing sites will be
among the first sites of cultural heritage to be registered. The first sites of
natural heritage and scientific interest will also be registered.
New operators will eventually move in. These new operators will search
the registry by inputting the location of the potential site. The result of the
32

“Corresponding interests” could be interpreted broadly to discourage harm historical
sites and sites of special scientific interest.
33
This registry format was first proposed by Prof. Sundahl in Mark J. Sundahl, An International Registry and Registrar for Priority Rights to Extract Resources on Celestial
Bodies, in 2019 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW (forthcoming in 2020).
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search would be a map of the location and the surrounding area. The user
could zoom in or out of the map. On the map, the user will see any sites that
have already been registered. If there is an existing operator in the vicinity of
the potential location, the new operator would have to make a decision. Can
the new company operate without harmfully interfering with the existing operator?
And here is the how the registry is the glue that holds this sparse regime
together—and why its creation is our final plea. By registering your resource
claim you are putting the world on notice of the sphere of your planned activity. If a later actor undertakes any resource extraction activity in the vicinity
of a registered claim, such actor will not be able to claim ignorance. That actor
must act with due regard to the interests of the registered party—and if there
is a chance of harmful interference, consultations must be undertaken.34 A
treaty will be needed to create this registry. The question is whether there is
sufficient political will to support even this modest proposal. Even a voluntary
registry, perhaps administered by a nonprofit organization, could make public
the necessary information about planned and existing missions to allow other
actors to fulfill most effectively their duty to operate with due regard. The
broad adoption of the voluntary registry would be the most critical aspect of
its success. As its use becomes customary, the registry will eventually serve
as the de facto mechanism for avoiding conflicts between space resource operations.35
The next step? We will see how these issues play out during the general
exchange of views on space resource activity at next meeting of the COPUOS
Legal Subcommittee in Vienna. In the meantime, preparations for establishing
a permanent human presence on the Moon move forward aggressively. If the
UN takes no concrete action on the issue, we will all have an opportunity to
observe in real time whether or not existing law is sufficient to handle any
potential conflicts that arise.

34
The notice provided by registration could also be important in an action under the
Liability Convention. Again, ignorance would be impossible to claim.
35
At a bare minimum, the international community would have to rely on the existing
UN registry that requires the sharing of information about space objects “launched into
Earth orbit and beyond.” Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
art. III, Jan. 14, 1975, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15. This registry does not typically contain much
detail regarding either the location or purpose of space objects, so it would be of questionable utility (particularly when lunar activity evolves to include many actors and activities
at which point specific information about neighboring activities will be critical to avoid
interference). The utility of the existing registry could be enhanced by an agreement (or
understanding) among states to provide more detailed information.

